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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
LA \\"'RENCE ~IIGLIACCIO, 
Pla.intiff afYUl Appella;nt; 
vs. 
FRANK DA YIS, SALLY DA YI:S, his 
wife, and JOHX B. DA YIS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL 
Case No. 
7412 
FROM THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Fred W. Keller, Judge 
ST.&TEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an Appeal by the plaintiff, the appellant, 
from the judgment of the Seventh Judicial District 
Court, setting in Emery County, Utah. The mining 
claims involved have lengthy descriptions so we refer 
this Court to the Answer of Respondents, (Judgment 
Roll pages 40-46) for their detailed description. The 
descriptions are of little significance from the view point 
of this Appeal. 
While the appellant brought this suit primarily to 
quiet title to seven (7) mining claims, the Complaint 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
contains three separate causes of action. One: To quiet 
title; Two: Ownership; obtained by adverse possession 
for over seven (7) years; and Three: An accounting for·~ 
damages for the commission of waste under our statute. 
(Complaint-Judgment Roll pages 50-55). The action 
was commenced on the 11th day of April, 1949, in Emery~~ 
County, by filing of the Complaint. (Judgment Roll page ~ 
50). A restraining order was issued and served upon all " 
of the defendants. (Judgment Roll pages 47-48). The 
case was tried without a jury. The defendant, John B. 
Davis, defaulted. 
J 
In January, 1941, John B. Davis, J. L. Safley, A. C.~ 
Guymon (Trans. 59) and J. W. Jensen located seven~ ,, 
(7) mining claims on the unsurveyed public domain in 
Emery County, State of Utah. Safley and Guymon, at 
different dates in 1941, quit-claimed their interests to ~ 
John B. Davis; J. W. Jensen quit-claimed his interest to 1 
appellant in June, 1948. On the 27th of May, 1942, 
(Trans. 41, 60, 61, 63, 64, 133) John B. Davis and wife J 
quit-claimed all their interests in and to the seven (7) ~ 
mining claims involved in this action to appellant for 
$1,000.00, which quit-claim deed was forceably withheld 
from appellant by J. B. Hammond (Trans. 44, 82) until ~ 
January 19, 1949, when it was recorded in Emery County. 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 1). Appellant tried to obtain this deed 
and finally did so on the date as aforesaid. Appellant 
did not owe F. B. Hammond anything and there was no 
reason for withholding it from appellant, and when 
appellant and John B. Davis called for it, Hammond~ 
1 
.. 
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refused to surrender, clahning that he had some sort of 
deal, to which deal appellant was not a party, although 
Hammond tried to make appellant a party. Delivery had 
been made to appellant on or about the 27th of May, 
1942, but he left his said deed with Hammond. The ap-
pellant took possesion of the mining claims in 1942 and 
from then until the present time, has had continuous and 
actual possession of all of these claims. (Trans. 134 to 
136). 
For over six years after 1942, there was very little 
mining done on these claims, except exploration work by 
appellant which was sufficient to hold possession. (Trans. 
134). In 1946, appellant learned that the Federal Gov-
ernment was seeking Uranium bearing ores, and he be-
. came active and by May of 1948, was prepared to mine 
ores from these claims. (Trans. 136). In the latter part 
of May, 1948, Frank M. Davis came to the home of appel-
lant, primarily to find out if appellant still owned these 
claims. He was told by the appellant that he, Lawrence 
Migliaccio, owned all the claims, as it was at about this 
time that appellant secured the remaining, outstanding 
interest from J. W. Jensen and wife. (Trans. 136-138). 
The appellant and Frank Davis, before the end of 
June, 1948, had entered into an oral agreement, called 
a "working agreement." (Trans. 136-138). By June 
28th, the claims had been restaked and in early July, 
appellant and Frank Davis were working the claims and 
selling the ores in Monticello, Utah. Appellant did the 
:. hauling and Frank did the mining on the basis of a 50-50 
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sharing of the profits from the sale of ores. (Trans. 
138). Mining under this agreement continued for a few 
months, until October 1948. 
Trouble developed between appellant and Frank 
Davis and another oral agreement was entered into 
in October, 1948 whereby appellant agreed to haul ore 
from the" old dump" that had been there since appellant 
stopped active mining in the latter part of July, 1942, 
and to allow Frank and some employees to mine and 
haul the new mined ore, but they were still to share 
profits, share and share alike. (Trans. 141). This con-
tinued until the 11th of January, 1949, when a serious 
quarrel took place which resulted in this law suit. (Trans. 
141 to 146). 
Meanwhile, in October, 1948, John B. Davis had ap-
peared at his brother, Frank's, solicitation, and began 
working on the claims with Frank, splitting Frank's pro-
fits 50-50. (Trans. 72-73). Before John B. Davis started 
to work with his brother, Frank, he came to Price in 
August from his home in Hood River, Oregon. On the 
1 
9th of August, 1948, appellant, John B. Davis, and Frank 
Davis drove to Castle Dale for the purpose of searching 
the records of the County Recorder's office for informa- ~ 
tion for Attorney Raymond Senior about what is known 
as the ''Gibbon Case.'' John B. Davis was a defen-
dant in this case. At this time, John B. Davis executed 
a quit~claim deed (Exhibit "C ") of a ONE-HALF UN-j 
DIVIDED INTEREST in the claims which the Record- j 
er's Records then (August 9, 1948) showed he owned 
1 
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of record a THREE-QUARTERS INTEREST. John B. 
Davis had deeded to appellant all his interest in 1942, 
(Exhibit I) but this deed had not then been placed of 
record. This deed of ~\.ugust 9, 1948 was recorded on 
the same day. (Trans. 77). 
J!ining was carried on under the first and second 
oral agreements from July, 1948, up to and including 
April 13, 1949, at which time, Frank M. Davis was re-
strained from working on the claims. Frank M. Davis 
operated these claims (alone with his employees) and 
sold ore therefrom from January 11, 1949 up to and 
including A pril13, 1949. 
The appellant relies upon the following errors com-
mitted by the Court for reversal of the Judgment and 
such other ruling as to the Court seems equitable. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED BY HIS SIL-
ENCE AND THAT THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED OF 
JOHN B. DA VTS TO THE RESPONDENT, 
FRANK DAVIS, DATED AUGUST 9, 1948, WAS 
VALID. (RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT "C"). 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS, FRANK M. 
DAVIS AND SALLY DAVIS, WERE AND ARE 
TENANTS IN COMMON, APPELLANT OWNING 
A % UNDIVIDED INTERES:T AND RESPON-
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DENTS OWNING A 3j8 UNDIVIDED INTEREST 
IN THESE MINING CLAIMS. (JUDGMENT 
PAGES 3 AND 4; JUDGMENT ROLL PAGES 
19 AND 22). 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE IN-
JUNCTION AND ORDERING THE CLERK TO 
DELIVER APPELLANT'S BOND TO THERE-
SPONDENTS, FRANK M. DAVIS AND SALLY 
DAVIS. (JUDGMENT PAGE 4; JUDGMENT 
ROLL, PAGES 19AND 22). 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT COULD NOT SET-OFF ALL THE 
ORE SALES OF THE RESPONDENT, FRANK 
M. DAVIS, BEYOND THE APPELLANT'S ORE 
SALE:S IF A SUIT ON THE UNDERTAKING 
FOR AN INJUNCTION, OR RESTRAINING OR-
DER, WAS BROUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS, ~ 
FRANK AND SALLY DAVIS, AGAINST AP-
PELLANT. (FINDINGS OF FACT PAGE 5; !• 
JUDGMENT ROLL PAGE 27). . 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN OVER-RULING THE J 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
(JUDGMENT ROLL PAGE 12). ·~ i 
6. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE 
RESPONDENT, FRANK M. DAVIS TO AC- ~ 
COUNT FOR HIS ORE SALES DURING THE 
~ 
OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY BEFORE 1 
1 
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THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS ISSUED 
AXD SERVED UNDER THE LOWER COURT'S 
DECREE THAT THE PARTIES WERE TEN-
ANTS IN COMMON. (JUDGMENT ROLL PAGE 
19-22). 
7. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DETERMINE THE RESPECTIVE INTERESTS 
OF APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS IN THE 
~IINING EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY AP-
PELLANT AND RESPONDENTS AND EM-
PLOYED IN THEIR MINING OPERATIONS OF 
THESE CLAIMS. 
ARGUMENT I. 
The Argument upon which the division of the brief 
is based deals with the Assignments of Error Numbers 
1 to 5 inclusive. 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT WAS ESTOPPED BY HIS SIL-
ENCE AND THAT THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED OF 
JOHN B. DAVIS TO THE RESPONDENT, 
FRANK DAVIS, DATED AUGUST 9, 1948, WAS 
VALID. (RESPONDENTS' EXHIBIT "C."). 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENTS, FRANK 
DAVIS AND SALLY DAVIS, WERE AND ARE 
TENANTS IN COMMON, APPELLANT OWNING 
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A FIVE-EIGHTHS UNDIVIDED INTEREST 
AND RESPONDENTS OWNING A THREE-
EIGHTHS UNDIVIDED INTEREST IN THESE 
MINING CLAIMS. 
3. THE COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE IN-
JUNCTION AND ORDERING THE CLERK TO 
DELIVER APPELLANT'S BOND TO THERE-
SPONDENTS, FRANK DAVIS AND !SALLY 
DAVIS. 
4. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE 
APPELLANT COULD NOT SET-OFF ALL THE 
ORE SALES OF THE RESPONDENT, FRANK 
DAVIS, BEYOND THE APPELLANT'S ORE 
SALES IF A SUIT ON THE UNDERTAKING 
FOR AN INJUNCTION, OR RESTRAINING OR-
DER, WAS BROUGHT BY THE RESPONDENTS, 
FRANK AND SALLY DAVIS, AGAINST AP-
PELLANT. 
5. THE COURT ERRED IN OVER-RULING THE 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Unfortunately, the Finding.s of Fact do not have 
their paragraphs numbered. We, therefore, quote the 
Finding important to our argument at this point, from 
page 4 of the Finding of Fact. It reads: .I 
''That defendant, Frank Davis, had heard of 
the existence of a deed from J. B. Davis to plain-
tiff, but on the other hand, the plaintiff know-
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ingly permitted the said Frank Davis to believe 
that he was acquiring one-half of the three-fourths 
interest of the said J. B. Davis, and participated 
in the transaction whirh resulted in the execution 
and delivery of the said deed of August 9th, 1948, 
and knowingly pern1itted said Frank Davis to 
perform labor and expend money relying there-
on." (Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Judgment Roll P. 23-28). 
From this finding, the Judgment and Decree de-
cided that the appellant was estopped by his silence and 
the quit-claim deed from John B. Davis to Frank M. 
Davis was valid. (Judgment and Decree page 4, Judg-
ment roll, page 22). 
STATEMENT 
.As the plaintiff, the appellant, understands this case, 
the matter that governs most of the errors assigned, 
hinges on whether the record establishes an estoppel 
against the appellant. The Assignments of Error, 2 to 
5, will be determined as error or not error, depending 
upon what the court holds in respect to the Assignment 
of Error No. 1, so Assignments of Error 2 to 5 will 
be included in the Argument of Error No. 1. That this 
Court may have the evidence conveniently before it, 
such portion of the transcript as appellant thinks con-
trols the question of Estoppel and the facts upon which 
this Findings and Judgment are grounded is presented 
substantially below: 
In the testimony that follows, Appellant has at-
tempted to cover the evidence that definitely relates to 
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the title ''Actual Notice.'' The respondents received a 
quit-claim deed from John B. Davis and wife several 
years before the quit-claim deed of John B. Davis to 
F·rank M. Davis, dated August 9, 1948. This evidence is 
so closely tied into the evidence relating to Estoppel that 
to state all of it separately under each heading would 
so lengthen this Brief that it may be objectionable to 
the Court. All the testimony quoted herein applies to 
the Arguments presented under the separate headings. 
(a) TESTIMONY FROM THE INJUNCTION PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
Taken on May 16, 1949. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF DOROTHY HEINER 
BY MR. RUGGERI: 
Q. Now, I will ask you whether or not you ever 
had a conversation with Frank M. Davis rel-
ative to the deed that you and John B. Davis 
signed over to Lawrence Migliaccio~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you have the first conversation, the 
first of such conversation or conversationsY 
A. Well, it was just before they went to work 
out to the mountain, wherever that was. 
(Inj. Proc. 16) 
Q. It was before they went to work on the moun-
tain~ 
A. Yes, sir .... 
Q. Now will you relate what was said at this 
time relative to the deed? 
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A. :Jir. Davis just told me that nf r. Migliaccio 
had the deed to the mines and he asked me if 
I had signed them and I told him at the time 
I didn't remember signing them and he said 
that nir. :Migliaccio had my signature on 
them, so after I seen my signature, I recog-
nized it. 
(Inj. Proc. 17) 
(Plaintiff puts in Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
without objection (Transcript page 22-23) 
for which plaintiff paid John B. Davis $1,000) 
DIRECT EXA~IINATION OF LAWRENCE MIGLI-
ACCIO BY ~IR. RUGGERI: 
Q. All right, Mr. Migliaccio, I will ask you 
whether or not you ever had a conversation 
with, or conversations with Frank Davis rel-
ative to your deed from John B. Davis~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now when did you have the first of such con-
versations~ 
A. At my home. 
Q. And when was it~ 
A. Around the latter part of May or first of 
June, somewhere in there. 
Q. What year~ 
A. 1948. 
Q. And who was present at this conversation~ 
A. My wife. 
Q. Who else~ List all the parties that were 
there, if anyone else. 
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A. I think Mrs. Sally Davis was there too. 
Q. And Frank M. Davis and yourself, is that 
right~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now what was said at this time relative to 
your deed from John B. Davis to the vana-
dium claims lto 7 inclusive~ 
A. He said, "Let's get- -" 
Q. Who do you mean by ''he''~ Let's use names. 
A. Frank Davis said to me, he said, "Let's get 
John down here,'' and I said, "What for-" 
He said, ''I want to get my share of that 
property.'' And I said, ''I have got the deed 
for the property ,we don't need him in any 
way. If I want to give anything, that is up to 
me.'' 
Q. And what did Frank Davis say, if anything? 
A. He said, "Oh, it's a forgery." 
(Inj. Proc. 34 and 35) 
Q. Now, do you remember anything else being 
said at that time, during this particular con-
versation~ 
A. Well, he said, ''Can I come down and work 
in down there~'' 
Q. And what did you say to him~ Give us the 
conversation. 
A. I said, ''Yes, you can come down and work on 
a working agreement of half the money." 
And he said, ''If I can get in down there, I 
would spend some money and there is plenty 
of ore down there, we can make a lot of 
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money.'' 
(Inj. Proc. 35) 
(b) EVIDENCE FROM THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT. 
DIRECT EXAM. LAWRENCE MIGLIACCIO BY MR. 
STEFFENSEN: 
Q. 'yell, repeat it as near as you can. 
A. Well, he came down to my house and he said, 
''Lawrence, do you still own, or does my 
brother own Temple Mountain~'' He said, 
"It is getting hot," he said, "this uranium 
deal,'' and I said, ''I know it,'' and he said 
something about, he said does my brother 
Jim own a part of that mountain and those 
claims,'' and I said, ''No. I own it and I 
have a quit-claim deed on it.'' 
Q. Now when you speak of Jim, who is that~ 
A. Well, Frank called John, Jim. He meant 
John Davis. 
Q. He referred to John B. Davis~ 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. And at that time he asked you the question, 
did he~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What else did he say~ 
A. Well, he said, ''What about me getting in 
down there, putting some machinery in that 
mine down there and getting things into oper-
ation.'' He said, ''You know,'' he said, 
''there is enough ore down there for you and 
I and many more.'' ''Yes, I think so,'' I 
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said, "What about getting in with you." 
"Well," I said, "I haven't got much money 
right now to start mining operations.'' 
Q. Did you enter into an oral or other agree-
ment~ 
A. Just an oral agreement. 
Q. And what was the basis of the agreement? 
A. Well, we figured, oh, he was to spend the 
money until we got it going good and we'd 
split fifty-fifty. Pay the expenses out after 
the ore had been dug. 
Q. What were you to furnish other than the pro-
perty~ 
A. 1 wasn't supposed to furnish anything, but 
I did. 
Q. What did you furnish~ 
A. I furnished two old trucks. 
Q. Did you haul ore with them~ 
A. Yes, ;sir. 
(Trans. 136-138) 
CROSS EXAM. OF MIGLIACCIO BY MR. MOYN-
IHAN: 
Q. Well you say that you told Frank in the 
Spring of 1'948, you didn't have to, that you 
didn't have to deal with John because you 
already had title to the property1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you claim that the title ever since May 
of 19421 
A. Yes, sir. 
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(Trans. 155) 
DffiECT EX~-\:JL OF nLilliE O'NEIL :MIGLIACCIO 
BY :JIR. STEFFENSEN: 
Q. Q. Are you acquainted with Frank Davis o? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \\nen did you first meet him in relation to 
anything happening about these claims~ 
A. I would say it \Yas around the middle of June 
he came to my home and had a discussion 
with Lawrence on the front porch. I was 
standing at the door because I was wondering 
who he was and I listened to it and he said 
to me, or said to Lawrence, "What about 
the Temple Mountain property~" and he said, 
"Are you still interested 1n it~" And Law-
rence said, '' Y e.;;;.'' And he said, ''Well that 
uranium deal is getting plenty hot, I would 
like to have a chance to go down there.'' And 
he says, ''What about my brother, John, 
does he still have an interest~" And Law-
rence said, ''No, he gave me his interest in 
1942.'' 
(Trans. 169:-170) 
A. Yes. One night when they both came to-
gether, why she said to me, ''Frank tells me 
that Lawrence told him that John had deeded 
him all the property in 1942. '' So she said, 
''I think that is the stupidest thing I ever 
heard of, we know that John wouldn't give 
the property to Mr. Migliaccio.'' 
THE COURT: Just a minute, was Mr. Davis 
there~ 
A. Yes. 
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THE COURT : When she said that~ 
A. Yes, she also stated, "We are going to get 
that deed and send it to Washington, D.C., 
because we know that the signatures on it are 
forged.'' · 
(Trans. 171-172) 
DIRECT EXAM. OF G. A. COOPER BY MR. RUG-
GERI: 
Q. Now, Mr. Cooper, I will ask you whether or 
not you are acquainted with Frank M. Davis? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. How long }lave you known Mr. Davis~ 
A. Off hand, I'd say about 5 or 6 years. 
Q. Now calling your attention to the month of 
June, 1948, I will ask you whether or not you 
had occasion to talk with Mr. Frank M. 
Davis concerning the Vanadium King claims? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Where did this conversation transpire? 
A. At the Walnut Bar in Price. 
Q. Do you recall what day in June of 1948 that 
was~ 
A. No, I couldn't tell you but it was the early 
part of June. 
Q. Now who was present besides you and Mr. 
Davis, if anyone~ 
A. Well, all the ones I can think of now is 
Jim Hartzell. 
Q. Now will you relate the conversation that you 
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and 1\Ir. Davis had relative to the \~anadium 
King claims 1 
A. \Yell, he mentioned to me that he was going 
to send for his brother John. I told him no 
need to send for John because John had no 
claim there at all. And he said, ''Why~'' I 
said, "'\Yhy Lawrence Migliaccio got a quit-
claim deed to that.'' And he said, ''If he 
has got a quit-claim deed to it, it has been 
forged, the name has been forged.'' And I 
said, ''I don't know anything about the names 
being forged." But I said, "I seen the deed." 
(Trans. 174-175) 
REBUTTAL EXAM. OF COOPER BY STEFFEN-
SEN: 
Q. This morning, Attorney Hammond, F. B., I 
believe it is, testified that you were in his of-
fice but you never saw a deed. Do you now 
.say that you saw a deed~ 
A. I did. 
(Trans. 315) 
Q. I show you the two exhibits and you pick 
out the one that you saw. 
A. This one. 
Q. That is the one you saw~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever seen that before~ 
MR. STEFFENSEN: The record will show that 
is Plaintiff's Exhibit 1. 
(Trans. 316) 
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CROSS EXAM. OF COOPER BY MOYNIHAN: 
Q. How did you happen to see that deed? 
A. I was up there with Mr. Migliaccio in Ham~ 
mond's offices. · 
Q. At what time? 
A. Oh, sometime previous to that, I wouldn't 
set no date, but it was before that time. 
Q. You never saw the deed in Migliaccio's pos~ 
session? 
A. Only there in the office. 
Q. It was in Mr. Hammond's office? 
A. That's right. 
Q. You didn't .see Migliaccio take it away with 
him? 
A. No. 
(Trans. 176) 
DIRECT EXAM. OF LESTER TOMLINSON BY MR. 
STEFFENSEN: 
Q. Are you acquainted with Frank Davis¥ 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How long have you known him? 
A. Well I have known him since 1924. 
Q. Do you recall any time in the spring of 1948 
driving, of having a conversation pertaining 
to these Vanadium King Mining claims with 
Frank Davis? 
A. Well, yes. We talked about these claims quite 
a number of times. 
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Q. "~ell what wa8 .stated the first time~ 
A. "~ell they was going down there and work 
those claims at Ten1ple 1\Iountain. 
Q. \Yell tell, go ahead. \Vas anything said about 
who owned them 1 
A. \Yell, I knew the thing from the beginning. 
I thought John Davis owned them when I 
first heard about it and then the next thing 
I knew about it, why Miglaccio gotten into 
it somewhere, I don't know what the deal 
"·as or anything. Only that Migliaccio had 
a quit-claim deed from John. 
Q. Had you ever seen it~ 
A. I saw it one time, maybe a couple of times. 
Q. Where~ 
A. In Hammond's office. 
Q. Now did you ever talk to Frank about that 
deed~ 
A. Well, I probably did. I told him that I 
thought Migliaccio had a quit-claim deed to 
the property. 
Q. Said you thought~ 
A. Well, I told him I seen it. 
Q. That was in June, 1948 ~ 
A. Well, it was either the later part of June 
or sometime in July but it was more than 
likely in July. I am quite sure that it was 
probably after middle of July, 1948. 
Q. And did you talk to him any other time about 
the deed~ 
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A. Well, just off and on as I seen him. 
Q. Before that~ 
A. I am not sure, I was sure that I had seen 
that deed in Hammond's office. 
THE COURT: You mean you told Mr. Davis, 
Frank Davis that~ 
A. Yeo, during our talks, we had been down to 
Temple Mountain, I was kind of interested 
down there myself and I was wondering how, 
what kind of claim, whether he bought in 
down there or how he owned an interest 
down there and that is how it come up I told 
him that I had seen this deed in Hammond's 
office, made out to Migliaccio, 
THE COURT : From John B. Davis~ 
A. Yes. 
(Trans. 182-183-184) 
DIRECT EXAM. FRANK DAVIS BY MR. MOYNI-
HAN: 
Q. Now, Mr. Davis, tell us about this deed from 
John Davis to Lawrence Milgliaccio dated 
oometime in May, 1940. What conversation 
did you have with Migliaccio about that deed? 
THE COURT: May, 1942~ 
MR. MOYNIHAN: Yes, 1942, that is right, Your 
Honor. 
A. I heard rumors of deeds but I never could 
chase down any definite deed but after we 
had the trouble-
Q. Well, now while you are talking about rumors, 
did you hear the former wife of John Davis 
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testify in this Court that you told her in 
September or October that Migliaccio had a 
deed to this property! Did you hear her 
testimony on that! 
A. I heard her testify, yes. 
Q. Well, now what is the fact, what conve-rsa-
tion did you have with her and where was it 
and what did ahe say? 
A. I met her in the Skaggs store. 
Q. At what place Y 
A. Or Safe way :S:tore in price and I asked her, 
I said, "Dorothy, did you sign a quit-claim 
deed that I heard that Migliaccio is supposed 
to have Y '' and she told me she didn't sign 
anything in Hammond's office but a divorce 
paper. 
(Trans. 257-258) 
CROSS EXAM. OF FRANK DAVIS BY RUGGERI: 
Q. Now, Mr. Davis, you say that all you have 
heard is rumor that Lawrence had a deed, is 
that right? 
A. That's all I ever heard. I never seen it. 
Q. What do you mean by rumors~ 
A. People talking about it, Lawrence mostly. 
Q. What did Lawrence tell you about it? 
A. Well, he told me many a time that, that he 
was supposed to have one. 
Q. Supposed to have one what? 
A. Quit-claim deed from John Davis. 
(Trans. 270) 
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Appellant refers this Court to Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"4." 
Q. Did you tell her (Mrs. F. Davis) that on June 
8, then to tell your brother John, that Mig-
liaccio told you that he had turned all his 
ahare over to him~ 
A. That was Migliaccio I understand told me. 
Yes, he told me that he heard that. 
Q. So that in fact then, it wasn't December of 
1948 that Migliaccio first told you he had a 
deed, it was sometime prior to June 8, 1948 
that he told you about the deed? 
A. I mean a deed that he could swear by. 
Q. He talked with you about the deed before 
June 8 didn't he1 
A. He couldn't record it, he had no deed. 
Q. Well that is what you state here that he told 
you? 
(Trans. 272) 
Q. And isn't it a fact that Mr. Migliaccio told 
you that he had all the interest" fn this pro-
perty prior to June 8, 1948? 
A. No, sir. 
_ Q. Then how did you know, or rather why did 
you state that he told you that in hia letter 
to John? 
A. State that again. 
Q. Why did you tell John in this letter that he 
had told you that? 
A. Well, he claimed he had it. I heard he had 
it, that's all. 
(Trans. 273) 
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REDIRECT EXA~L- FRANK DAVIS BY MOYNI-
HAN: 
Q. In connection with conversation with Migli-
accio about John B. Davis's deed, what, if 
anything, did he ever say to you about his 
ability to produce or whether he had re-
corded it1 
A. He couldn't produce it or record it. 
(Trans. 293) 
CROSS: EXAM. OF SALLY DAVIS BY RUGGERI: 
Q. Now when is the first time that you say ac-
cording to your knowledge Frank had any 
information that Lawrence had the deed to 
the mining property~ 
A. It was a rumor came in, I don't recall when 
. it was. It was after Frank talked to John 
in Oregon and it was in June and we were, he 
had been to Lawrence's and John over the 
telephone, Frank asked him if he still owned 
his interest in Temple Mountain and he said 
''absolutely.'' 
Q. When did he ask him that~ 
A. Well, I don't recall the date. He wouldn't 
admit that but it was-
Q. Did you ever go with your husband, Frank 
up to Attorney Hammond's office to f}nd 
out for yourself whether or not there was 
a deed there~ 
A. No. It wasn't recorded. Frank came to the 
courthouse, he said it .should be on record. He 
searched the books in the Rerocder's office, 
he couldn't find it. He asked Lawrence about 
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it, Lawrence said he knew about a deed. 
Q. That's right .. 
A. That's all, he said he heard about it. But 
he said he had never seen it. 
Q. Didn't he also say if he had the money he 
would go get it1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Didn'the tell you th~t was in Mr. Hammond's 
office~ 
A. No, sir, he didn't. He said, that's all that was 
said. 
Q. Didn't he say that the reason he couldn't 
get it was because Mr. Hammond wouldn't 
surrender it to him because he owed him some 
money~ 
A. No, sir. Why he couldn't get that record, he 
said he knew about a deed, he had heard 
about it, but he had never seen the deed and 
that's all he knew about it. 
Q. When did he tell you that~ 
A. He kept on telling that up until August. 
Q. When did he tell you the first time? 
A. The first time was when we went in the house 
one time and asked him about it. 
Q. What day was that~ 
A. I couldn't tell the day, but it was sometime in 
June, I do remember. 
Q. So that you first had information that he 
claimed to own these claims, in June didn't 
youf 
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A. He claimed, yes, but he never produced it. 
(Trans. 309-10-11) 
Q. \Yell he told you he knew about the deed and 
had the deed didn't he T 
A. He said one time that he had heard about 
the deed himself. 
Q. And when wa.s that T 
A. But that he didn't own the deed and that he 
didn't have that deed. 
Q. When was the one timeT 
A. That was sometime in June. 
Q. That was before you wrote this letter? 
A. Yes, certainly. 
Q. I hand you what has been marked Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 4 and ask you to examine that. I will 
ask you whether or not you have seen this 
before? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When did you first see itT 
A. I wrote it. 
Q. Where did you write itT When T 
A. I imagine on June 18, 1948. (See Ex. 4) 
Q. Who.se name did you sign to itT 
A. Frank's 
Q. Well, was Frank there when you wrote this 
letter' 
A. I believ<e Frank was. 
Q. Did he tell you what to put in it? 
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A. Oh, he told me, but I put it in my own style. 
Q. Did you write paragrph 3 in your own style? 
A. Yes. 
(Trans 311-312) 
Q. He said he could, he new wher·e to get it 
(deed) didn't he~ 
A. Yes, but he never offered to get it. 
Q. Did you ask him to get it for you~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why didn't you ask him~ 
A. Because it wasn't my business. 
Q. You weren't interested in that property? 
A. Yes, I was interested in that property but he 
didn't hav·e it recorded in the proper place 
to find it. 
(Trans. 313) 
Q. Isn't it a fact that both you and Mr. Davis 
knew that there was an existing deed? 
A. We heard rumors that there was an existing 
deed. 
Q. What did you do to run those rumors down? 
A. We asked John. We asked Mr. and Mrs. Mi-
gliaccio and we went to the courthouse and it 
wasn't recorded. What more do you want? 
Q. Did you go and see Mr. Hammond to see 
whether or not he had the deed~ 
A. Well, I thought if Mr. Migliaccio had such 
a thing, he'd certainly go and get it and have 
it recorded. 
(Trans. 313-314) 
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~\HGU~IENT AND LAW 
THE RESPONDENTS RECEIVED NOTHING 
BY THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED FROM JOHN B. 
DAYIS DATED ~\UGUST 7,1948 FOR THE RESPON-
DENTS HAD ACTU~\L NOTICE OF THE EXIS-
TE~CE OF THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED OF JOHN B. 
DA YIS OF ~IA Y 27, 19±2, TO APPELLANT BEFORE 
AUGUST 9th 1949. 
I. ACTUAL NOTICE - The Law. 
Our Utah Code, Ann. Vol. 4, Title 78-1-·6, reads: 
''Every conveyance of real estate, and every 
instrument of writing setting forth an agreement 
to convey any real estate or whereby any real 
estate may be affected to operate as notice to 
third person.s shall he proved or acknowledged 
and certified in the manner prescribed by this 
title and recorded in the office of the recorder of 
the county in which such real estate is situated, 
but shall be ·calicl and binding between the part~es 
thereto without such proof, acknowledgment, cer-
tification or record, and as to all other persons 
who have had actual notice. '' 
''Where purchasers of real estate had .such 
notice of adverse claims of plaintiffs as would put 
reasonable person upon inquiry to ascertain what 
interest was, they took subject to any equities or 
interest that plaintiffs had in premi.ses, though 
such interest was not :recorded as required by 
this section. ' ' 
Gappmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 U. 236, 177 P. 763. 
''The demands of this section are answered 
if a party dealing with the land has information 
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,of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man 
upon inquiry, and which would, if pursued, lead 
to actual knowledge of the state of the title; and 
this is actu~l notice.'' 
ToZwnd v. Corey, 6 U. 392, 24 P. 190, Aff'd 154 U.S. 
499, 38 L. Ed. 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144. 
''Under thJis sectiJon actual possession 0/IU],. oc-
cupwncy .amownts to· ''·actual notice'' to all the 
world of grwntee's .rights, though his deed is no·t 
recorded.'' 
Neponset Lwnd & Live Stock Co., v. Dixon, 10 U. 334, 
37 P. 573, applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, S 2611, which is 
·substantially similar to present action. 
''.Actual occupancy is enough to put parties 
dealing with the premises up:on ilnquiry. '' 
To·land v. Corey, 6 U. 392, 24 P. 190, Aff's 154 U.iS.. 
499, 38 L. Ed. 1062, 14 S. Ct. 1144. 
''To entitle one to protection as a bona fide 
purchas·er as against an unrecorded deed, his pur-
chase must have been made without notice, actual 
or constructive of the unreeorded deed.'' 
San Petro, etc. Co. v. U. 8. 146 U.S. 120, 35 L. Ed. 
912. 
46 C. J. 53'9, ''A notice is r'egarded in law as 
actual, when the party sought to be affected by it 
knows of the existence of a particular fact in 
question, or is conscious of having the means of 
knowing it.'' 
Parker v. Mast.ers, 85 Kan. 130, 116 Pac. 22.7. 
Rho1des v. Outoalk 48 Mo. 367. 
'' N otiee is actual when it is directly and per-
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sonally given to the party to be notified.'' 
46 C. J. 433. ''It is the general rule that what-
ever puts a party on inquiry amounts in judg-
ment of the law to notice, provided the inquiry 
becomes a duty, and would lead to a knowledge 
of the facts by the exercise of ordinary intelli-
gence and understanding.'' 
Woo·d v. Carpenter 101 U.S. 135, 25 L. Ed. 807. 
Essex Nat. Bank v. Hurley 66 Fed. 2d. 552. 
46 C. J. at pg. 544, "Wherever facts put a 
party on inquiry, notice will be imputed to him, if 
he resignedly abstains from making inquiry for 
the purpose of avoiding notice.'' (and cases there 
cited.) 
20 R. C. L. pages 346-47, "What·ever fairly 
puts a person on inquiry is sufficient notice, where 
the means of knowledge are at hand; and if he 
omits to inquire; he is then chargeable with all 
facts which, . by proper inquiry, he might have 
ascertained. . . Notice of facts which would lead 
an ordinary prudent man to make an exami~ation 
which, if made, would disclose the existence of 
other facts is sufficient notice of such facts.'' 
(and cases cited in note 11). 
''A person has no right to shut his eyes 
and/ or his ears to avoid information, and then 
say that he had no notice.'' 
Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Do11arn, 142 U.S. 417, 
38 L. Ed. 1063. 
"It will not do to remain wilfully ignorant 
of the thing really ascertainable. '' 
McQuadl;y v. Waren 20 Wall, 14, 22 L. Ed. 311. 
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LeVine v. Whitehouse 37 Utah 260, 109 Pac. 2. 
The facts that are involved by the foregoing law 
consist of (a) respondents coming to appellant's home, 
1naking inquiry as to who owned the mining claims. 
Respondents were definitely informed that appellant 
owned all of them. Transcript quotes are given in the 
evidence above and in Exhibit 4. (b) Respondent, 
Frank Davis, entered into an oral agreement, whereby 
he was to furnish machinery and other mining equip-
nTent, and share the profits, share and share alike. (Tran-
script pages 128, 138, 276, 277, 165.) (c) Appellant 
furnished the trucks and hauled the ore to Monticello 
where it was sold. (Transcript pages 136-139.) (d) The 
latter modifications of the first oral agreement are stated 
in the Transcript pages, 103, 128, 242, 244. (e) The 
actual sharing of the profits, after the deed of August 
9, 1948, is revealed by the Transcript pages 243-44, 274, 
276-277. All operations on these claims was done under 
the agreements between appellant and Frank M. Davis 
and the agreement between the. two Davis brothers, from 
October 30 to the time when Frank M. Davis left the 
property on April 13, 1949. (Transcript page 146.) 
Frank Davis continued to operate under the second 
oral agreement until the filing of the suit, and had never 
indicated to appellant that he claimed any title to the 
claims until his Answer was filed in the lower court. 
From the evidence pr·esented, it is clear that the 
respondents had the actual notice which our statute re-
quires. There existed such a relation, by telephone, by 
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correspondence and by conversation, between the 
brothers, John B. and Frank l\1. Davis, that it seems 
impossible to believe anything but that John B. Davis 
had informed his brother, Frank, that he had quit-claim-
ed all of his interest in the involved mining claims to 
appellant. In Exhibit 4, the respondents state that they 
had been informed by appellant of the existence of Ex-
hibit 1. This, in itself, is sufficient actual notice to fulfill 
the requirements of the statute as is revealed in the 
cases above pre.sented and those followng. 
(a) ACTUAL NOTICE OR MEANS OF NOTICE 
''There is no estoppel when the other party 
had notice of the facts ; to have the benefit of an 
estoppel, a person must show good faith and 
diligence to learn the truth.'' 
Hirning v. Fede~al Res,e.rve Bamk, 52 F. 2d, 383. 
Eyers Woolen Co. v. Gisum, 84 N. H. 1, 146 A. 511, 
64 A. L. R. 1116. 
S & E Motor Corp. v. New York Indemnity Co., 
255 N.Y. 69, 174 N. E. 65. 
When the facts are weighed, they clearly reveal 
by the letter, Exhibit "4 ", a request by Frank M. Davis 
for informetion from John B. Davis, about where the 
title to the.se claims stood. In this Exhibit, respondent 
states that they have been informed of such a deed as 
Exhibit 1. Then on the several occaslons when John 
B. Davis was with his brother, Frank, after this letter 
was written, it is quite unreasonable to believe that if 
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John B. Davis didn't write to Frank and thereby in-
form him, he most certainly did tell Frank in one or 
more of John's visits to Price, before August 9, 1948, 
as well as on that date, of his deed to appellant. It 
would be extremely unnatural for respondents to write 
to John B. Davis and ask about a deed and then not 
find out about it definitely when he, John B. Davis, came 
to see them and work with them. 
Should it be found that John didn't inform Frank 
of John's quit-claim deed to appellant, then certainly, 
it was the duty of Frank from the ''rumors'' he heard 
of such a deed, to have ascertained what the true fact 
was. Frank Davis spent a large part of his time in 
Pri,ce where F. B. Hammond's office is located. It would 
have taken but a few minutes for Frank to have learned 
the truth about the deed he had been told so many times 
about by four of the witnesses quoted above. It would 
appear, that he was extremely negligent for not having 
done so. For this negligence, this court must hold that 
the appellant is not estopped and that appellant really 
owns all the claims subject to the ownership of the United 
States of the fee. 
(b) POSSESSION CONSTITUTES ACTUAL NOTICE 
''Under this section a deed as between the 
parties and those having notice thereof is good 
without- any aclmowledgement. And act'l«Jl, pos-
session constitutes notioe. '' 
Jordan v. Ut.ah R. Co., 47 U. 519, 522, 156 P. 939, 
applying Comp. Laws 1907, S. 975, which is identical 
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with present section 78-3-2, P. 507. (Notes) 
· • Ordinarily a conveyance of land is valid 
between the parties, and as to all parties having 
acf1wl nohce thereof, without b·eing .recorded." 
Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Oo., 5 Ut. 205, 210, 14 P. 338 . 
.. It is a general rule that whatever puts a 
party on inquiry amounts in judgment of law to 
be notice, provided the inquiry becomes a duty, 
and would lead to knowledge of the facts by the 
exercise of ordinary intelligence and understand-
ing.'' 
Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 Pac. 426. 
In 46 C. J. pg. 534 S. 2, it states: · 
''A notice is regarded in law or action when 
the party sought to be affected by its knows of 
the existence of the particular fact in question, 
or is conscious of having the means of knowing 
it .... Notice is actual when it is directly or per-
sonally given to the party to be notified.'' 
''Actual notice need not be directly proved. 
Like any other fact, it may be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence. 20 Am. J ur., Evidence, sec. 
272, p. 260, sees. 335, 336, pp. 312, 313; 31 C. J. S., 
Evidence, S. 178, p. 880; 46 C. J. S., Notice, .sec. 
110, p. 568; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisdprudence, 
5th Ed., Sees. 595, 596, pp. 611-619." 
People v. Juehling, 10 Cal. App. 2d 527, 531, 52 P. 
520. 
Schleif v. Grigsby, 88 Cal. App. 174, 180, 181, 263 P. 
1 255. 
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Hawke v. California Re,aUy, etc. Co., 28 Cal. App. 
377, 382, 152 P. 959. 
Cope v. Davison, 30 Cal. 2d 193, 200, 180 P. 2d 873, 
171 A. L. R. 667. 
Under Section 78-1-6, Utah Code Ann., it states: 
''A deed as between the parties and those 
having notice thereof is good and actual posses-
sion constitutes notice.'' 
Jordan v. Utah R. Co., 47 Utah 519, 156 Pac. 939. 
Gaffmayer v. Wilkenson, 53 Utah 226, 177 Pac. 763. 
The appellant was in possession of these mining 
claims in June, 1948, and had been in possession of them 
since June, 1942. (Tr. 134) Frank Davis came to appel-
lant and entered into an oral working agreement on the 
basis of a 50-50 share in the profits from the sale of ores 
shipped and sold from these claims. Why did he come 
to appellant if he didn't know of his brother's, John B. 
Davis, deed to appella~t, as the deed from J. W. Jensen 
had not as yet been executed or received. (Exhibit 3) 
The court will recall the testimony of Sally Davis, where 
she states that after Frank had telephoned his brother, 
John, they called upon appellant at his house. (Tr. 305) 
The J. W. Jensen deed, Plaintiff's Exhibit 3, was not 
received until late in June, 1948. 
Why did Frank M. Davis and Sally Davis come to 
see appellant at his home, after telephoning brother John, 
if John had not informed them of his (John's) deed to 
appellant over the phone~ The evidence quoted above 
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tells us that no other deed was in existenc.e except Ex-
hiYit 1, prior to this ti1ne, which time was early in June, 
1948. 
(c.) SOl\fE TITLE :JIUST BE IN GRANTOR OR 
HE CONVEYS NOTHING BY HIS DEED 
In 18 C. J., p. 159, 160, \Ye find: 
'·There should be some title or interest, in 
law or equity, in the grantor to enable him to 
convey, and, except under a power of appointment 
.so to do, a grantor can convey no greater estate 
than he has or in whic.h he has an alienable title 
or interest. It follows that a deed from a person 
without title, or interest whic.h he may convey, 
is in operative as a c.onveyance, and the grantees, 
undr a release and quit-claim, will take nothing 
where the grantor has no interest which he can 
convey. So a ded is inoperative where the grantor 
has previously conveyed his entime title. 
From the foregoing evidence, the law cited, and 
more to be presented hereafter, we now present further 
argument as to estoppel. We look first at our statutes, 
keeping in mind that there was a quit-c.laim deed from 
John B. Davis and wife to appellant of all his interest 
in these seven (7) mining claim.s, but that said deed had 
not been rec.orded at the time John B. Davis exe,cuted 
a deed of AN UNDIVIDED ONE-HALF of his claimed 
of rec.ord THREE-QUARTERS INTEREST to his 
brother, Frank. Frank had been told about this deed of 
' John's to appellant several times prior to John B. Davis' 
quit-claim deed to his brother, Frank Davis of August 
9, 1948. Frank Davis had been put upon notic.e of the 
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existence of this deed which notice he admits in his and 
his wife's letter to John B. Davis (Exhibit 4). 
II. ESTOPPEL 
THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ESTOPPED 
BY THIS SILENCE OR OTHER.WISE 
The lower court, it appears, based its Finding and 
Judgment upon the idea that the appellant was estopped 
by his silence on two occasions and that because of such 
.silence, the validity of the quit-claim deed of August 9, 
1948, of John B. Davis to his brother Frank M. Davis, 
was upheld. The testimony upon which the court held is 
on the following evidence. 
The parties, except Sally Davis, are in the Court-
house in Castle Dale, when the following evidence is 
given: 
CROSS EXAMINATION OF J. B. DAVIS BY 
l\iOYNIHAN: 
'' Q. And in the presence of Lawrence Migliaccio 
and Frank Davis and the county attorney, ¥r. 
Jewkes, didn't you say Iwant a deed, in 
substance, I want a deed for part of these 
Vanadium King Claims to Frank~ Would 
you have time to draw up the deed~ 
A. No, I did not. N'ot in front of Lawrence Mig-
liaccio at all .... 
Q. And didn't Mr. Jewkes tell you that he had 
time and if you'd come up to his office, he'd 
make out the deed~ 
A. Yes, he said he had time to make out the 
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deed, but we didn't do it in front of Lawrence 
:Migliaccio. (Tr. 99-100) 
Q. And after, isn't it a fact that you stated to 
Jewkes on the 9th day of Au_gust in the Clerk 
and Recorder's office, Castle Dale, Emery 
County Courthouse, Emery County, Utah, 
in substance and effort, 'Can you make out 
a deed from me to Frank for some of these 
claim8~' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Migliaccio was there~ 
A. ~Iiglia,ccio wasn't there. He was in the court-
house, but he wasn't in the presence of where 
I asked that. 
Q. But you then came upstairs with the County 
Attorney~ 
A. That was, that que8tion you asked me before 
was asked in Mr. Jewkes' office. (Tr. 100) 
Q. And you had a conversation though, did yo:u 
not, in the Recorder's office wherein you re-
quested Jewkes, while Migliaccio was in the 
Recorder's office, if he could make some 
papers out for the8e claims to Frank~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't say anything to him about making 
out a deed down there~ 
A. No, sir, not in front of Migliaccio, I didn't. 
We asked him up in his room. 
Q. Well, did you make it down there, not in front 
of Migliaccio, did you have any ~onversation 
about it down there~ 
A. Not that I remember about, no. 
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Q. Were you watching Migliaccio every minute 1 
A. No, but he was in the Recorder's office and 
there was nothing said about them papers 
until we got up in Jewkes' room. 
Q. Was there any reason why you didn't want 
Migliaccio to hear what you were ·.saying that 
day~ 
A. Yes, I didn't want him to know that I was 
doing that. 
Q. You came together. 
A. I know it. But he didn't know we was going 
to do that though. (Tr. 101-102) 
Q. After you and Migliaccio and Frank talked 
in June and July, wasn't the agreement that 
each of you were to have a third interest if 
Frank would go ahead and develop the claim' 
A. In what ore we got. 
Q. Isn't that the reason you filed the affidavit 
that I have heretofore questioned you about? 
A. For what ore was dug, yes. (Tr. 105) 
Q. Wasn't the consideration for the deed made 
by you to Frank on the 9th day of August 
based upon his demand for ~wme interest in 
the claims before he advanced money for 
their operation and development¥ 
A. Well, he wanted some protection and I fig-
ured be:cause Migliaccio hadn't recorded the 
one I gave him that I done that and I gave 
Frank that on." (Tr. 106) 
REBUTTAL-J. B. DAVIS BY STEFFENSEN: 
'' Q. Did you hear the-were you here in this build-
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ing before the Clerk's office on the 9th of 
~'-ngnst and did you hear what Frank said 
about yon~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. "\Vere you three here~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. "\Vas anything said in Lawrence's presence 
about the deed that wa8 made by Jewkes 
that day1 
A. Ko, sir. 
Q. Are you sure about that 1 
A. Yes, sir, absolutely. 
Q. "\Vas anything said about that deed in Law-
rence's presence so he could hear it1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When that deed was made by Jewkes and 
taken down to the County Recorder's office, 
who took it there 1 
A. I did. 
Q. Was Lawrence there 1 
A. He wa8 out in the hall. 
Q. Did you see you with the deed 1 
A. No. 
Q. And you had it recorded that day1 
A. Yes, sir. ( Tr. 318-319) 
Q. Did you tell your brother before you gave 
him that deed of August 9th that Lawrence 
owned that property 1 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. Did he ask you~ 
A. Well, he hinted around about it but I never 
did deny that Lawrence had a deed. 
Q. You never denied it but you say you never 
told .him about it~ 
A. No." (Tr. 321) 
REBUTTAL-J. B. DAVIS BY MOYNIHAN: 
'' Q. You could have gone up with Lawrence Mig-
liaccio to Hammond's office and got that deed 
and recorded it before the 1st of July when 
you 1came back here and avoided all that 
trouble if you knew~ 
A. I do not. I definitely could not because Ham-
mond refused to let us have the deed." (Tr. 
323) 
DIRECT-FRANK DAVIS BY MOYNIHAN: 
"Q. Was anything said to Mr. Jewkes~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did you say to him~ 
A. Well-
Q. In the presence of Migliaccio~ 
A. Well, I called him over and asked him if 
he could or would make a quit-claim deed 
from John to me. 
Q'. How far was Migliaccio from you when you 
made that request~ 
A. Well, he was just, we was just there all to-
gether. 
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Q. Yon called him from where he was and he 
came over to where you three were~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. "\Yhat did you do after yo'u asked him that 
question Y What wa8 his reply1 
A. He'd do it. 
Q. And where did you go 1 
~\. To his office. (Tr. 247-248) 
THE COURT: Did you ever, now listen carefully, 
did you ever have any conversation with 
John (Lawrence) :Jliglia~cio about your get-
ting an interest in the ownership of the claims 
in this case 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Where did you have such a con-
versation 1 
A. At Senior's office. 
THE COURT: Who wa8 present1 
A. John, Lawrence, and Raymond Senior. 
THE COURT: Just to shorten the matter, was 
that at the time that has been referred to in 
the evidence here when a certain paper was 
drawn1 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Now state as nearly as you can 
what was said and who said it at that time. 
Now, bear in mind the question is, what was 
said upon the subject of your getting an in-
terest in the mines, the claims. 
A. John told Raymond Senior that he would 
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give me one-half of his interest. 
THE COURT: And what did Migliaccio, was 
:Migliaccio there when that was said~ 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: What did he say, if anything to 
that~ 
A. He said nothing. 
Q. At the time on the 28th of June, 1948, can 
you re;call that as the date when Frank and 
you were in that office~ (Se~ior's office) 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was Lawrence there~ 
A. I don't believe he was. 
Q. On the 28th~ 
A. No, sir. (Tr. 317) 
Q. Did you hear Mr. Sutch or whatever his 
name is, I don't remember the name. 
THE COURT: Oliver Sutch. 
A. No, I don't believe I did. 
Q. Were you there when Oliver was there~ (In 
Senior's office) 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was that the time Lawrence was there~ 
A. No, sir, he was not there at that time. 
Q. He wasn't there at that time~ 
A. No, sir." (Tr. 317-18) 
It is very evidence that Lawrence, the appellant, 
1 
···~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
never had heard John B. Davis claim that he owned 3A, 
of these seven mining clain1a. This testimony of John 
B. Davis is corroborated by Exhibit 3, as its recording 
date is June 28, El-1-8, by Lawrence niigliaccio. This 
definitely establishes that appellant was not in the offices 
of Senior on the 28th of June-just as thh; witness states. 
''THE COURT: Did you ever, at any time have 
any conversation in the presence of Migliac-
cio on the subject of your getting an interest 
in the claims~ 
A. John and I-
THE COURT: Just a minute, did you ever at 
any other time~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Where were you~ 
A. We were here in this courthouse. 
THE COURT: Who was present~ 
A. John, Lawrence and myself. 
THE COURT: Were in this courthou5e ~ 
A. Out by this Clerk's office. 
THE COURT: You and John and Lawrence, is 
that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: What was that date~ 
A. August 9th. 
THE COURT: 1948~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: What was said~ 
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A. We decided-
THE COURT: No. What was said? What do 
you recall? Now don't say you decided be-
cau.se that is a conclusion. What did you 
say and what is your best recollection of 
what was said by you or anyone else there 
on the subject of your getting ownership in 
this property? 
A. We talked this over and decided-
THE COURT: No, what was said? 
A. Well, I don't understand you. 
THE COURT: Well, what did Lawrence Migliac-
cio say at that converen;ce? 
A. He was ju.st there listening. John was putting 
up the talk. 
THE COURT: What did John say? 
A. He said, 'I will go and we will have you a 
deed made out.' 
THE COURT: Where was Migiaccio when he 
said that? 
A. He was with us. 
THE COURT: What did he say, if anything~ 
A. Nothing. 
THE COURT: What did you say? 
A. Well, I said, 'We will see Mr. Jewkes.' 
THE COURT: W er·e there any other times when 
you discus.sed that in the presence of Mr. 
Migliaccio? Discussed your getting an inter-
est in the claims? 
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~-\. I couldn't say.·' ( Tr. 263-264-265-266) 
CROSS EX~\:JIIX~\TION OF FRANK DAVIS BY 
RUGGERI: 
"'Q. But did you tak about that deed in the car~ 
A. \Yell I couldn't say, but we talked about the 
deed and we talked about the deed and had 
the arrangements n1ade in the Recorder's 
office. 
Q. Now as a matter of fact, you and John didn't 
talk about that deed in the car, did you~ 
~-\.. We might have, we might not, I don't re-
member. 
Q. You are not sure are you~ 
A. Not sur,e no, sir. (Tr. 278-279) 
Q. That's right, 1close by and you could have 
said the same thing to him there couldn't 
you~ 
A. Well, I didn't want to disturb the other peo-
ple. I called him over and we talked by our-
selves. 
Q. Didn't you want Lawrenee to hear what you 
were going to tell him~ 
A. He could have heard me.'' ( Tr. 279) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF R. R. JEWKES BY 
MOYNIHAN: 
"Q. While you were in the Recorder's office, did 
you have occasion to see Lawrence Migliac-
cio, Frank Davis, and John Davis~ 
A. I did. 
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Q. What were they doing~ 
A. As I remember, they were asking the Re-
corder, or Deputy Recorder, regarding some 
conveyanee. What conveyance I just don't 
know. 
Q. Did you meet them there~ 
A. I was at my ab;stracting table in the Re-
corder's office when I looked up and saw 
the 3 gentlemen at the counter. 
Q. Were any questions asked of you there~ 
A. Yes. John or Frank, I was better acquainted 
with Frank, beckoned with a finger and 
asked me if I'd help him with a deed. 
Q. Did he say to whom ~ 
A. Not in the Recorder's office, I don't think. 
Q. Was Magliaccio there~ 
A. He was in the room. 
Q. Was John Davis there~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. When he motioned with his finger to you, did 
you come over to where he was~ 
A. I did, went to the count~er. 
Q. And was Migliaccio there~ 
A. He was in the room, but now his exact posi-
tion in relation to mine and Davis', I don't 
feel competent to locate. 
Q. Well, state whether or not they were all-
A. They were all in the Recorder's office at that 
time, the three of them, yes. I have a definite 
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impression that they were. 
Q. And where did you g·o'? 
A. "\Y e proceeded upstairs to my off~ce, County 
~-\.ttorney in the adjoining room there. 
Q. "\"\~hat did you do there 1 
~-\.. I asked him their business and it was the 
desire of John to have a quit-claim deed made 
in favor of his brother, Frank, and they asked 
m·e if I would help them." (Tr. 214-215) 
CROSS EX~-\.~IINATION OF JEWKES BY RUG-
GERI: 
"Q. Now, how fare away from Mr. Frank Davis 
were you sitting when he summoned you up 
close to him 1 
A. Oh, approximately less than, le5s than the 
distance between you and me. 
Q. You'd say about feet~ 
Q. You were in speaking distance to him right 
there weren't you~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. He didn't tell you what his business was at 
that distance did he~ 
A. No, I came over to the counter. (Tr. 219-220) 
Q. Now neither John B. David or Frank Davis 
told you who they wanted the deed made to 
did they~ 
A. Not in the Recorder's office. 
Q. Yes, down in the Recorder's office, and did 
they tell you which property it affected in 
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the Recorder's office~ 
A. No. 
Q. All of that information wasn't disclosed until 
after you were up in the County Attorney's 
office~ 
A. That is true. 
Q. Now, was Mr. Miglia;ccio in the County At-
torney 's office on the '9th when this deed 
was being prepared~ 
A. I don't recall that he was. I am almost sure 
that he was not. He had been in my office 
on several occa.sions, but not with Frank and 
John on this occasion. 
Q. And he wasn't there on this- ~ 
A. I'd say he was not in my attorney's office on j i 
this date." (Tr. 220-221) 
(b) LAW 
Bas~ed upon the above evidence, the cases cited below 
appear to appellant to be applicable. The law of estoppel j 
as it applies to this case follows. 
Hilton v. Sloan, et .al., 108 Pac. 689 at page 699, the 
Court by Justice Frick, states: 
''The party invoking the estoppel must show 
that at the time he acted upon what appeared to 
him to he the real fa;ct, he lacked both the knowl-
edge and the reasonable means of ascertaining 
the real fact.s, and that he relied upon the facts 
and circumstances as they then appeared to him 
in view of the conduct of the party against whom 
the estoppel is involked.'' 
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In the rase of lYellsville East Field I rr. Co., et ~al. 
v. Lindsay Larnd & Lit·estock Co., et al., 137 P2 p~ge 634, 
Sylibus. it says: 
• 'The elements requisite for 'estoppel' are 
substantially those necessary to found an 
action for deceit, with exception of element of 
knowledge of falsity. 
"An 'e8toppel' involves turpitude or fraud 
such as misleading statements or acts, or conceal-
ment of facts by silence with result that one party 
is induced by words, conduct or silen0e of another 
party to do things which he otherwise would not 
have done.'' 
In Re: Evans, 130 Pa,c. 217, ±2 Utah 282, Justice 
Straup on page 225 of Pacific ha8 this to say: 
'' Estoppel8 are odious, and every presump-
tion is against them until the right to apply them 
affirmatively appears with certainty by the right 
record.'' 
Ut. State Bldg. & Loan Ass'n. v. Perkins, et al., 173 
Pac. 950, 53 Utah 4 7 4. In the course of the opinion, the 
Court by Justice Gideon, has this to say about estoppel 
on facts somewhat the same a8 those of the instant case: 
"It was insisted on by respondent that Per-
kins, one of the appellants was estopped. (The 
plaintiff Company is in no position to urge the 
ground of estoppel.) All the fact.:; surrounding 
the execution of the conveyances were known to 
it (respondent), and it cannot, for that reason, 
claim that it acted to its injury in ignorance of 
the facts.'' 
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The Idaho Supreme Court, in Little 1/. Bergdahl 
Oil Co., 95 P2 433, holds in its opinion at page 838: 
''To constitute an estoppel, it must be shown 
there was a false representation or concealment 
of a material fact; that itwas made with knowl-
edge, either actual or constru'ctive, of the facts; 
that the party to whom the false representation 
was made was without knowledge or means of 
acquiring knowledge of the real facts; that the 
false representation was made with the intention 
that it should be acted upon and the party to 
whom it was made must have relied on or acted 
upon it to his prejudice.'' 
See T~acy Loa;n & Trust Co. v. Op~Cnshaw Invest-
ment Co. et al., 132 P2 388, 102 Ut. 509. 
Cook v. Cook, 174 P2 434 (Utah). 
Batters v. Santa Fe Nat. Life Ins. Co., 138 P2 1019, 
47 N. M. 202. 
'I 
In 21 C. J. 1129-30, we quote: 
''Necessity of Lack of Knowledge or of 
Means of Knowledge : As a corollary to the pro-
position that the party setting up an estoppel 
must have act~ed in reliance upon the conducts 
or representations of the party sought to be 
estopped, it is a general rule essential that the 
former should not only have been destitut'e of 
knowledge of the real facts as to the matter in 
controversy, but should have also been without 
convenient or ready means of acquiring su.ch 
know}edge. One relying on an estoppel must have 
exercised such reasonable diligence as the cir-
cumstances of the case require. If he conducts 
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hin1self with a careless indifference to means of 
information reasonably at hand or ignores highly 
suspicious circumstances which should warn him 
of danger or loso, he ,cannot invoke the doctrine 
of estoppel.'' 
(Utah-Centennial Eureka JI in. Co. v. Juab Cownty, 
22 Utah 395, 62 P. 102-!; Brigha.m Young Trust Co. v. 
Wagner, 12 Utah 1, 40 P. 764; Poynter v. Chipman, 8 
Utah -!-!2, 32 P. 690.) 
(19 F. 2d 781; 2-!2 P. 518; 253 P. 137; 257 P. 406) and 
other cases cited in the notes. 
There are many caseo akin to the foregoing. Here 
we refer to but a few, which hold in acord with the gen-
eral and universal rule that "the party asserting estop-
pel must be ignorant of the facts.'' 
Tomas v. Hellman, 1 P2 31; Maggini v. West Coast 
Life Ins. Co., 29 P2 263; California Canning Peach 
Gr-owers Ass'n. v. Williams, 69 P2 893; Killian v. Cousel-
ko, Supreme Do Unias Portuguees De Estado d. Calif. 
"Generally, doctrine of estoppel is not re-
garded with favor and should be applied only 
when all elements constituting an estoppel clearly 
appear ... " 
Susman v. Exchange Nat. Bank of Colo~ado Biprrings, 
183 P. 2d. 57. 
"The essential el'ements of 'equitable estop-
pel' are false representation or concealment of 
facts; knowledge, actual or con.-;tructive, of the 
real facts; the person to whom the representa-
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tion was made must be without knowledge or 
means of knowledge of the real facts; representa-
tion must have been made with int·ention that it 
should be acted upon; and party to whom it was 
made must have relied on or acted upon it to 
his prejudice.'' J 
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57,176 Pac. 912. 
Clarkson v. ran Antwerp, 200 P. 2d 442. 
Rosser v. Texas Oil Co., 48 P2 327, 173 Okla. 309. 
In Re: Davis esta.te, 101 P2 761. 
Mercer Casualty Co. v. Lewis, 108 Pac. 65. 
Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n. v. 
National Finding Co.rp., 114 P2 49. 
Farmers Reservo!ir & Irrigation Co. v. Fulton Irri. 
g~ation Dit'ch Co., 120 P. 196. 
I 
Fite v. Van Antwerp, 200 P2 439. 
(1) NO ESTOPPEL BY SILENCE, UNLESS 
THERE IS A DUTY TO SPEAK 
The District Court seemingly thought that the ap'" 
pellant was under a duty to speak. It isurged that where 
the respondent, Frank Davis, had ''actual notice'' under 
the statute 78-1-6, Utah Code Ann. 1'943, which has been 
quoted above, it was not the duty of appellant to speak, 
·even if he knew what J. B. Davis and Frank Davis were 
up to when they made the deed. (Exhibit C) The evi-
dence as to whether appellant heard any conversations 
between the brothers or that appellant knew anything 
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about what the DaYis Brothers were up to is very 
meager, unc.ertain, and at n1ost, not a clear statement 
by the respondent as to what artually took plac.e. The 
evidenre referred to has already been presented. Ap-
pellant's denial of any knowledge of what Frank and 
John B. Davis were doing is strengthened when we hear 
what appellant says to these brothers months later, when 
at the mine, appellant says to both Frank Thi. and John B. 
Davis at Transcript pages 1-1-5 and 146: 
.. You know darn well, you guys, that I have 
got a deed and you know it is to that property.'' 
The testimony of Frank Davis is certainly not clear 
as to appellant's participation in the making of the quit-
claim deed of August 9, 1948. 
The Montana Supreme Court, in the case of She.rlo'ck 
v. Greaves, 76 P2 87 at 91, holds: 
" ... mere silence cannot work an estoppel. 
To be effective for this purpose, the person to be 
estopped must have had the intent to mislead or 
a willingness that another should be deceived, 
and the other must have been misled by the 
silence.'' 
See also: Fitzwater v. Norcross et al., 37 P2 522. 
Even if what Frank Davis states were true, appel-
lant did not actually know the deed had been executed 
and put on record, for we read: (Tr. pages 101, 102, and 
Exhibit 4). This testimony here refered is given below. 
If appellant did not in some more definite manner 
participate in the ex,ecution of this deed than is indi-
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catd in this testimony, he had no duty in fact, in law, or 
in conscience, to speak. Appellant told Frank many times 
as appears in the evidence above presented that John 
B. Davis had quit-claim'ed' all hi.s interests in these claims 
to him. Why in reason or common sense need he now 
at the Recorder's office, or should he then tell him 
again. Frank Davis had had ample opportunity to 
actually see the deed of John B. Davis to appellant. 
Such failure to investigate is simply pure neglect and 
respondent's position a.s to an estoppel is not worthy 
of consideration. 
Our Supreme Court in the casre of Utah State Build-
ing Commission for the Use amd Benefit of Mountaitn 
States Supp~ly Co. v. Gre,at American Indemnity Co., et 
al, 140, P. 2, 763, at page 772, says: 
"It is generally held in order for silence to 
work an estoppel, there must be a legal duty to 
speak, or there must be something wilful or cul-
pable in the silence which allows another to place 
himself in an unfavorablre position by reason 
thereof.'' (Citing cases.) 
From all the evidence, there is grav~e doubt that 
appellant had ever heard of the deed of August 9, 1948, 
or why should he have stated: 1 
''You know darn well, you guys, that I have 
got a deed and you know it i8 to this property." 1 
(Trans. 145-146.) 
and if appellant knew, why would John B. Davi.s say: 
'' Q. And you had a ;conversation though, did you 
not, in the Recorder's Office wherein you re-1 
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quested Jewkes, while l\1igliaccio was in the 
Recorder "s office, if he could make some 
papers out for these claims to Frank 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You didn't say anything to him about making 
out a deed down there 1 
A. No, sir, not in front of l\1igliaccio, I didn't. 
\V e asked him up in his room. 
Q. Well, did you make it down there, not in 
front of Migliaccio, did you have any conver-
sation about it down there 1 
A. Not that I remember about, no. 
Q. Were you watching Migliaccio every minute 1 
A. No, but he was in the R!e;corder's office and 
there was nothing said about them papers 
until we got up in Jewkes' room. 
Q. Was there any reason why you didn't want 
Migliaccio to hear what you were saying that 
day~ 
A. Yes, I didn't want him to know that I was 
doing that. 
Q. You came together. 
A. I know it. But he didn't know we was going 
to do that though. (Trans. 101-102.) 
Q. What is the fact as to whether you and Migli-
accio and the Davis' went to the office, law 
office of Senior and Senior in Salt Lake the 
latter part of June, 1948, for the purpose of 
discussing this rna tter ~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. You did, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Migliaccio was there~. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he assert any claim to anything else ex-
cept the Jensen interest at that timeT 
A. There was no claims mentioned at that time. 
Q. Senior & 8enior gave you some advice, didn't 
theyT 
A. Yes, sir. That was on fighting this other case 
that was coming upT" (Trans. 92.) 
If respondent had wanted to parti;cipate in the own-
ership of the mining claims he could hav'e asked appel-
lant to deed directly to hims·elf, Frank M. Davis. Why 
all the secTecy about the deed of August 9th, 1948T Th 
only answer that has any sense or reason in it is just 
what John B. Davis states: 
"We didn't want Lawrence to know about 
it." (See Trans. page 101-102.) 
The facts in this, our case, will not justify the con-
clusion that appellant had a duty to speak. Why would 
it he appellant's duty to reiterate that which he had so 
many times before then, already told Frank. It looks 
somewhat as if Frank and John were trying to ''put one 
over" on the appellant, in the hope that appellant could 
not obtain his deed from Hammond. This inference is 
strengthened when we read Mr. Hammond's testimony 
and examine Exhibit 4. Mr. Hammond, in 1943~ got 
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John B. Davis to execute a quit-claim deed (Exhibit 5) 
to Lawrence Migliaccio. This deed decribed 1Claims that 
I 
John B. Davis had never located, but Hammond with-
held Exhibit 1 in order to force appellant to record a 
worthless deed so that Hammond could collect 2lj2 per-
cent from somebody else. B}: examining Exhibits 1 and 
5, this idea can be seen clearly. 
(2) THERE IS NOT ESTOPPEL WHEN PARTIES 
ARE NEGLECT 
The respondents cannot claim estoppel by virtue 
of their own negligence. The respondents, by Frank 
Davis' own admissions, had been told several times that 
John B. Davis had deeded all his interest in the mining 
claims to appellant. He was told by two persons, Mr. 
Cooper and Mr. Tomlinson, that the -deed was in J. B. 
Hammond's office. (Trans;cript pages 174-175-176 and 
182-183-184 and 185.) Frank -Davis spent much time in 
Price, within a few steps of where Hammond's office 
is located. But he never took interest enough in its 
existence to go and see it. 
In the case of Gordon v. Pettingrill, et al., 96 P2 416, 
the Supreme Court of Colorado states on page 418: 
"A litigant will not be heard to say he was 
ignorant of the facts which it was to his interest 
to know, and which, if awake, he would have 
known.'' 
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Kloppen-
burg v. Mayse, 88 P2 883, at page 18, says: 
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''Equity· will not do for a litigant which he 
had the power to do and could have done for him-
self and declined or neglected to do when the 
choice and opportunity was to protect himself." 
(Citing other Idaho ,cases.) 
At no time after August 9th, 1948, is there any evi-
dence in the record that even hints that appellant looked 
upon or dealt with the respondents, as interested owners, 
with himself. On the contrary, the evidence strongly 
points to the fact that the brothers, J. B. and Frank 
Davis were working the claims on the basis of a 50-50 
agreement to share the profits made from the sales of 
ores by both appellant and respondents; John B. Davis 
to receive one-half of what Frank made. (Transcript 
pages 128.) 
"Q. John wasn't here until you sent for him? 
Now, Mr. Davis, if Lawrence wasn't the 
owner of that property, why did you go to 
him to enter into a contract to go to work? 
A. He and I was just agreeing. 1 
Q. What were you agreeing to~ 
A. To an operation at the mine. ,. 
Q. All right, so that the only agreement between 
you and Lawrence was 13. working agreemtmt 
at the mine, isn't that right~ 
A. That's right, a working agreement. 
Q. You were never to get any title from Law-
rence or from John, isn't that right~ 
A. No, my agreement was to furnish money to 
start the mine on a paying basis. 
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Q. That's right and you ·were to get 50% of the 
profits, isn't that right J? 
~-\. Fifty percent of the profits until John arrived 
and then it \n1s split 3 ways. 
Q. ~-\Jl right that means, or rather the agreement 
was that the ore shipments and the money 
therefrom would be split 3 ways 1 
~-\. That's right. (Tr. 276-277) 
Q. And with that lmderstanding you agreed to 
put up all the money and still only take back 
a fifty-fifty profit, is that right 1 
A. Take back fifty-fifty of the profits and then 
one third of the profits. After October, we 
went one-third, before October, Lawre~ce and 
I went fifty-fifty. 
Q. .And you said on direct examination they 
made a proposition wherein you wer to fur-
nish all the money, is that right~ 
A. Until the property was paid for.'' (Tr. 274) 
A fuller account of this sharing has been given 
above. Let us here remind this court that" after October 
we went one-third". vVhy one-third if appellant only 
owned one-fourth 1 But up to October it was 50-50. This 
was after the deed of August 9, 1948. 
3. THE LAW GENERALLY 
Our Supreme Court in many cases has laid down 
the elements of estoppel, but we present here, the case 
of Kelly v. Richards, et al., 83 P2 731, and a few other 
authorities which have this to say: 
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"It is elementary that as a matter of plead-
ing an estoppel in pais exists only when facts 
are alleged which show that one person has by 
his words, deeds, or conduct so behaved that 
another person in good faith relying upon such 
conduct has been intentionally led thereby 'to 
change his position for the worse and who would 
not have so changed his position except for the 
conduct of the other party .... 
"In order to constitute this kind of estoppel 
there must exist a false representation or conceal-
ment of material facts; it must have been made 
with knowledge, actual or constructive of the 
facts; the party to whom 'it was made must have 
bee.n without knowledge or the mearn.s of knowl-
edge of the real facts; it must have been made 
with the intention that it should be acted upon; 
and the party to whom it was made must have 
relied on or acted upon it to his prejudice. To 
constitute an 'estoppe lin pais' there must' concur 
an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with 
the claim afterward asserted, action by the other 
party thereon and injury to such other party. 
There can be no estoppel if either of these ele-
ments are wanting. They are each of equal im-
portance.'' 
21 Corpus Juris, pp. 1119, 1120; see also, Pomeroy's 
Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) P. 1644; Bigelow on 
Estoppel (6th Ed.) pp. 603-604 .... 
"It is an essential element of estoppel in 
pais that the person involving it relied upon the 
representation or conduct of the other party, was 
influenced in his own conduct by it, and would 
not have ajcted as he did but for the acts of which 
he now complains. If complainant's act appears 
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to be the result of his own will of judgment, if it 
doea not appear to be the proximate result of 
the conduct or representations of the adverse 
party. there is no estoppel. The conduct must of 
itself have been sufficient to warrant or induce 
the course of conduct by the party seeking to 
invoke estoppel and it must have been made for 
the purpose of inducing auch response and action 
by the complainant." 
In harmony with many other casea including our 
Utah cases, the California Supreme Court holds in 
Illoss v. Underwr1iters Report, Inc., 83 P2 03, quoting 
from page 507 : 
''The evidence fails to show the essential 
elements of an estoppel. One relying on a plea 
of estoppel must have been ignorant" of the true 
state of the facts and must have been intentionally 
misled by the a:ct of the other to his injury." 
(citing cases) 
The respondent in this case suffered no injury, loss 
or prejudice. Frank Davis worked the claims for over 
three montha, and respondents' Exhibit '' F '' shows that 
he sold, during this time, over $14,000:00 worth of ore, 
for which he was paid in cash by the purchaser. He 
purchased from the money he received from the sale of 
ores, a $2,200.00 compressor and over $1,000.00 worth 
of other equipment, which he now is employing in his 
operation on these claims. Respondenta are at least bet-
ter off now than they were on August 9th, 1948 by over 
$3,000.00. (Tr. 255-256) 
Tuff v. Bagley, et ~al., 276 Pac. 912: 
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''One of the essential elements which must 
enter into and form a part of an equitable estop-
pel is that the truth concerning the fajcts relied 
upon by the person claiming the benefit of the 
estoppel was unknown. A person may not avail 
himself of this conduct, act, language, or silence 
of another under the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel, unless such person has been misled thereby.'' 
(Also 2 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. 4th Ed., :S. 805.) 
Utah State Bld,g. & Lo·an Ass'n. L Pe.rkims et al., 
173 P. 950, has this to say: 
"In order to constitute an estoppel, there 
must be a misrepresentation or concealment of 
material facts; it must have been made with 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the facts; 
the party to whom it was made, must have been 
without knowledge of the real facts; it must have 
been made with the intention that it should be 
~cted upon; and that the party to whom it was 
made must have acted upon it to his prejudice." 
The waiver Hy appellant that the Court finds of an 
accounting on appellant's Third Cause of Action was 
not a general waiver. It was merely a waiver of an ac-
counting as to appellant's Third Cause of Action, a 
statutory cause of action for trespass. This could not, 
at the time it was waived, have been a general waiver 
as at that stage in the trial, there had been nothing ap-
pear in the evidence that would indicate that the court 
would find that the appellant and respondents would be 
found to be tenants in common-not even the respond-
ents had thought so as they proceeded to make an ac-
counting and would have ;continued doing so had their 
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evidence not been objectionable on the grounds of not 
fulfilling the law and rules of evidence governing such 
an accounting. The idea appellant had in this early 
waiver is illustrated in the case of Lillywhite, et al v. 
Coleman, et al., 52 P2 1157, an Arizona case. It would 
appear by this ruling that respondents in the present and 
instant case waived appellant's waiver as a matter of 
law, for respondent does not take this waiver seriously 
as they proceed to render an accounting. 
Attention is called to the waiver of appellant, in 
which he does not require the respondents to amend their 
answer, pleading estoppel. The Court will notice that 
this waiver occurred at that stage in the trial to only that 
evidence relating to the presence or absence of appel-
lant, in Senior'~ law office in Salt Lake City, and it did 
not extend to the necessity of pleading an estoppel in 
the relation to the evidence pertaining to the quit-claim 
deed of August 9, 1948. 
Laske v. Lampasoria, 200 P2 826. 
''The burden rests wholly upon the respond-
ents to prove their estoppel.'' 
Ga.rrett v. Cook, 200 P2 21. 
''Burden rests upon one who relies upon 
equitable estoppel as a defense to an action to 
quiet title to satisfactorily prove all necessary ele-
ments of his alleged claim in that regard.'' 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 6 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE 
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RESPONDENT, FRANK DAVIS TO ACCOUNT FOR 
HIS ORE SALES DURING THE OCCUPATION OF 
THE PROPERTY BEFORE THE RESTRAINING 
ORDER WAS iSSUED AND SERVED. 
If, as the lower Court holds, the appellant and re-
spondents were tenants in common, then the duty of 
each tenant is to account to the other for ores, removed 
and sold, on their separate operations. If these parties 
are tenants in common, then the lower court ·erred by not 
allowing full accounting and equal set-offs. The Court's 
decision would be and is in the nature of penalty which 
is 
1
Certainly not warranted by the evidence. 
Should this Court uphold the Lower Court on its 
theory of tenants in common, then app~llant is entitled 
to 10/16 interest in the equipment or its value, as it is 
listed and priced on pages 255 and 256 of the Tran-
script. Appellant is also entitled on this theory, to a 
full accounting from the respondents from October 1, 
1948, up and including April13, 1949, the date Frank M. 
Davis left the property. (Tr. 114) Not having made 
proper findings on these matters were errors on the 
part of the Lower Court. 
We deem it only necessary to call the Court's atten-
tion to this matter as the law is so universal in its ap-
plication, we feel, as did the attorneys for the respond-
ents in their Lower Court brief, that the article on 
"Tenancy in Common' in 62 Corpus Juris, beginning at 
page 401, and especially the following quotations taken 
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from this brief and from that article are particularly 
applicable, to-wit: 
• · :JriXES AND :MINERALS. · Two or more 
persons owning undivided intere~ts in mining 
ground are tenants in common.'' 
62 C. J., page -!21, S. 26. 
"Each tenant in ,common is equally entitled 
to the use, benefit, and possession of the common 
property, and may exercise acts of ownership in 
regard thereto.'' 
62 C. J., page 421, S. 26. 
''MINES AND :MINERALS. In accordance 
with the general rules relative to the use and en-
joyment of the common property, tenants in 
common in mines and minerals are equally en-
titled to the use and enjoyment of the common 
property. One tenant in common may occupy and 
operate the common property, and is bound to 
care for it as if it were his own. He cannot ex-
clude his co-tenant from exer,cising the same 
rights, and he cannot, by developing the property, 
obliterate the interest of his co-tenant." 
62 C. J., page 422, S. 27. 
''RENTS AND PROFITS RECEIVED ... 
the rule may now be stated in general terms to 
be that the co-tenant receiving more than his just 
share of the rents and profits as to the common 
property may be required to account to his co-
tenants in proportion to their respective shares 
for the excess received by him.'' 
62 C. J ., page 448, S. 65. 
''Proceeds or profits diminishing corpus of 
estate. A co-tenant is liable to account for pro-
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fits produ,ced by his own efforts if such income 
is realized through a diminution of the corpus 
of the estate, as by quarrying, removing minerals 
or oil, or carrying away timber." 
62 C. J., page 450, S. 65. 
''MINING ... And the tenant in common tak-
ing the mineral cannot keep the proceeds of a 
sale thereof without accounting, on the theory that 
the portion of land furnishing the coal is no more 
than his just due.'' 
62 C. J., page 455, S. 73. 
As will be seen from the foregoing general princi-
ples, the Lower Court erred in its Finds of Fact, Con-
clusions and Decree, even on the Court's theory of the 
case. (Judgment Roll pages 12-22 and 23-28.) It wholly 
overlooked this important matter and should be reversed 
on this alone, as the Court made no findings covering 
this or did the court render any judgment covering the 
division of their money. 
ASSINGMENT OF ERROR NO. 7 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DETER-
MINING THE RESPECTIVE INTERESTS OF AP-
PELLANT AND RESPONDENTS IN THE MINING 
EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY APPELLANT AND 
RESPONDENTS AND EMPLOYED IN THEIR MIN-
ING OPERATIONS OF THESE CLAIMS. 
According to the testimony of Frank M. Davis, the 
appellant owns at least a ONE-THIRD (1/3) INTER-
EST in a dump 
1
Car, a mule and horse worth $150.00; a 
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compressor worth $2,264.00; a jackhammer valued at 
$255.00; and 215' of hose valued at $75.35; 240' of pipe 
valued at $56.00. Thi.s property totals $2,975.35. (Tr. 
pages 253-25±.) 
That the appellant has this interest is stated defin-
itely by Frank ~I. Davis as follows : 
''Q. Now is all that equipment paid for~ 
A. No. sir. 
Q. How much of it is paid for~ 
A. A little left on the Compressor. 
Q. Is the rest of it all paid for~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. So that you own that, is that right~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That equipment belonged, half of it to Mr. 
Migliaccio under the contract~ 
A. When it is paid for, his interest is in it, sure 
it is." (Tr. 288-289) 
The Court ignored in its Findings, Conclusions of 
Law and Decree, this matter. Appellant considers this 
an important as well as reversible error. But on the 
basis of the Court's Judgment, appellant should have 
been found to own not less than 10/16 of this property, 
but the Lower Court does nothing about it. 
Appellant urges that this error is sufficient to re-
quire a reversal of the Lower Court's Judgment. 
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THEREFORE : The appellant respectfully submits 
that the Judgment of the District Court should be re-
versed, vacated and set aside, and that this Court give 
judgment for the appellant, granting sole ownership to 
him of the seven ( 7) mining claims as described in re-
spondents' Answer, together with costs of appeal and 
costs in the Lower Court. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Copy of the foregoing brief is re:ceived on this ___________ _ 
) 
day of ----·--------------------------------------------------------, 1949. 
Attorneys for Respondents 
State of Utah ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
K. K. Steffensen, being duly sworn says that he is 
an Attorney at Law and is the Attorney of Record for 
the above named Appellant in the above entitled cause, 
and that his office is in 414 Felt Bldg., Salt Lake City, in 
the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. That Luke G. 
Pappas and Moynihan-Hughes-Sherman are the Attor-
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neys of Record for the above named Respondents in said 
cause and that they, the said Attorneys reside: 
Luke G. Pappas-Price, Carbon County, State of Utah. 
Moynihan..:Hughes-Sherman-Montrose, Colorado.' 
That in each of the said places, there is a United 
States Post Office and between said place.s and Salt Lake 
City, there is a regular daily communication by mail; 
that on the------------ day of November, 1949, Affiant served 
two (2) true copies off Appellant's Brief in the above 
entitled case on the said Luke G. Pappas and Moynihan-
Hughes-Sherman, the Attorneys of Record for the Re-
spondents, by depositing copies of ·.said Appellant's Brief 
on said date, in the Post Office at Salt Lake City, in the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, properly enclosed 
in a sealed envelope, addressed to each of said Attorneys 
and at their respective addresses given above and pre-
paying the po.stage thereon. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ------------ day 
of November, 1949. 
NOTARY PUBLIC, RESIDING AT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
My .commission expires --------------------------------------------------· 
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